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Martin Luther’s Influence on Legal Reforms and Civil Law 
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Abstract 
The Lutheran reformation transformed not only theology and the church 
but law and the state as well.  Beginning in the 1520s, Luther joined up with 
various jurists and political leaders to craft ambitious legal reforms of church, 
state, and society on the strength of Luther’s new theology.  These legal reforms 
were defined and defended in hundreds of monographs, pamphlets, and 
sermons published by Lutheran writers from the 1520s to 1550s.  They were 
refined and routinized in hundreds of new reformation ordinances promulgated 
by German cities, duchies, and territories that converted to the Lutheran cause.  
By the time of the Peace of Augsburg (1555) -- the imperial law that temporarily 
settled the constitutional order of Germany--the Lutheran Reformation had 
brought fundamental changes to theology and law, to church and state, marriage 
and family, education and charity. 
Critics of the day, and a steady stream of theologians and historians ever 
since, have seen this legal phase of the Reformation as a corruption of Luther’s 
original message of Christian freedom from the strictures of human laws and 
traditions.  But Luther ultimately realized that he needed the law to stabilize and 
enforce the new Protestant teachings. Radical theological reforms had made 
possible fundamental legal reforms.  Fundamental legal reforms, in turn, would 
make palpable radical theological reforms.  In the course of the 1530s onwards, 
the Lutheran Reformation became in its essence both a theological and a legal 
reform movement.  It struck new balances between law and Gospel, rule and 
equity, order and faith, structure and spirit.  
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The Lutheran Reformation brought fundamental reforms not only to 
theology and the church, but also to law and the state.  The radical theological 
reforms introduced by Luther and his colleagues triggered major legal reforms in 
sixteenth-century Germany and Scandinavia.  These new Protestant laws, in 
turn, helped to establish and enforce the new norms and practices of theology 
and polity, doctrine and liturgy, church and state, marriage and education, charity 
and morality, and these remained in place in Lutheran lands until the twentieth 
century. 
 
Law and Politics in the Two Kingdoms 
 
The starting point for these reforms of law and religion was Luther’s 
complex theory of the two kingdoms. God has ordained two kingdoms or realms 
in which humanity is destined to live, Luther argued, the earthly kingdom and the 
heavenly kingdom. The earthly kingdom is the realm of creation, of natural and 
civil life, where a person operates primarily by reason and law. The heavenly 
kingdom is the realm of redemption, of spiritual and eternal life, where a person 
operates primarily by faith and love. These two kingdoms embrace parallel 
heavenly and earthly, spiritual and temporal forms of righteousness and justice, 
government and order, truth and knowledge. But these two kingdoms ultimately 
remain distinct. The earthly kingdom is distorted by sin and governed by the law. 
The heavenly kingdom is renewed by grace and guided by the gospel. A 
Christian is a citizen of both kingdoms at once and invariably comes under the 
distinctive government of each. As a heavenly citizen, the Christian remains free 
in his or her conscience, called to live fully by the light of the word of God alone. 
But as an earthly citizen, the Christian is bound by law, and is called to obey the 
natural orders and offices that God has ordained for the governance of this 
earthly kingdom.1 
Luther’s two-kingdoms theory turned the traditional hierarchical theory of 
spiritual and temporal authority on its side. For centuries, the church had taught 
that the pope is the vicar of Christ, in whom Christ has vested the “plentitude of 
his power.” This power was symbolized in the “two swords” discussed in the 
Bible (Luke 22:38)—the spiritual and the temporal swords. Christ had handed 
these two swords to the highest being in the human world—the pope, the vicar of 
Christ. The pope and his clerical delegates wielded the spiritual sword, in part by 
establishing canon laws for the governance of all of Christendom. The pope, 
however, was too holy to wield the temporal sword. He thus delegated this sword 
to those authorities below the spiritual realm—emperors, kings, dukes, and other 
political officials.  These civil magistrates were to promulgate and enforce state 
laws in a manner consistent with canon law and church teachings.  State law was 





Luther rejected this hierarchical view of government. For Luther, the 
earthly kingdom featured three natural “estates” (Stände) or forms of authority: 
the family, the church, and the state. These three estates stood equal before God 
and each other.  Each was called directly by God to discharge complementary 
tasks in the earthly kingdom. The family was called to rear and nurture children, 
to teach and to discipline them, to cultivate and exemplify love and charity within 
the home and the broader community. The church was called to preach the word, 
to administer the sacraments, to catechize the young, and to discipline its 
members. The state was called to protect peace, punish crime, promote the 
common good, and to support the church, family, and other institutions derived 
from them. 
Not only were these three estates equal, rather than hierarchical, Luther 
continued; only the state had formal legal authority—the authority of the sword to 
pass and enforce positive laws for the governance of the earthly kingdom. The 
church was not a law-making authority. It had no sword, no jurisdiction, no canon 
law, and no courts. To be sure, pastors and theologians were expected to preach 
and prophesy in promotion of justice, order, and the common good.  Each local 
church needed internal rules of order to govern its members and officers, and 
external legal structures to protect its polity and property.  But it was up to the 
local magistrate to pass and enforce all such church laws in consultation and 
cooperation with the local clergy and theologians.2 
Luther was more concerned with the function than with the form of the 
state. He had hoped that the emperor would endorse the Reformation, and 
accordingly included in his early writings some lofty panegyrics about Christian 
emperors ancient and modern. When the emperor failed him, Luther turned at 
various times to the nobles, princes, and peasants, and in turn wrote favorably 
about each of them.3  Such writings must be read in their immediate political 
context, however, and not used to paint Luther as a theorist of political 
absolutism, elitist oligarchy, or constitutional democracy. Luther had no firm or 
consistent theory of the forms of political office. He did not sort out systematically 
the relative virtues and vices of monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy. He said 
little about thorny constitutional law questions of the nature, purpose, and 
institutionalization of executive, legislative, and judicial power.  
Luther focused instead on the general status and function of the political 
office—both before God and within the community. On the one hand, Luther 
regarded the magistrate as God’s vice-regent in the earthly kingdom, called to 
elaborate and enforce God’s Word and will, to reflect God’s justice and judgment 
on earthly citizens. The magistracy was, in this sense, a “divine office” and a 
“Godly calling,” within the earthly kingdom. “Law and earthly government are a 
great gift of God to mankind,” Luther wrote with ample flourish. “Earthly authority 
is an image, shadow, and figure of the dominion of Christ.”  But magistrates also 




are the bows and arrows of God,” equipped to hunt down God’s enemies near 
and far, using military strength and criminal power. The hand of the Christian 
magistrate, judge, or soldier “that wields the sword and slays is not man’s hand, 
but God’s.”4 
On the other hand, Luther believed, the magistrate was the “father of the 
community” (Landesvater). He was called to care for his political subjects as if 
they were his children, and his political subjects were to “honor” him as if he were 
their parent. Like a loving father, the magistrate was to keep the peace and to 
protect his subjects from threats or violations to their persons, properties, and 
reputations. He was to deter his subjects from abusing themselves through 
drunkenness, sumptuousness, prostitution, gambling, and other vices. He was to 
nurture and sustain his subjects through the community chest, the public 
almshouse, the state-run hospice. He was to educate them through the public 
school, the public library, the public lectern. He was to see to their spiritual needs 
by supporting the ministry of the locally established church, and encouraging 
their attendance and participation through the laws of Sabbath observance, 
tithing, and holy days. He was to see to their material needs by reforming 
inheritance and property laws to ensure more even distribution of the parents’ 
property among all children. He was to set an example of virtue, piety, love, and 
charity in his own home and private life for his faithful subjects to emulate and to 
respect. The Christian magistrate was to complement and support the God-given 
responsibilities of parents and family members for their children and dependents, 
without intruding on the paternal office. And he was to support the preaching and 
sacramental life of the local church without trespassing on the ecclesiastical 
office.5 
These twin metaphors of the Christian magistrate—as the lofty vice-regent 
of God and as the loving father of the community—described the basics of 
Luther’s political theory and constitutional law. For Luther, political authority was 
divine in origin but earthly in operation. It expressed God’s harsh judgment 
against sin but also his tender mercy for sinners. It communicated the law of God 
but also the lore of the local community. It depended upon the church for 
prophetic direction, but it took over from the church all legal jurisdiction. Either 
metaphor standing alone could be a recipe for abusive tyranny or officious 
paternalism; but both metaphors together provided Luther and his followers with 
the core ingredients of a robust Christian republicanism and budding Christian 
welfare state. 
Natural and Positive Law in the Earthly Kingdom  
What kept the life of the earthly kingdom intact and in order, Luther 
believed, was the law of God, and its elaboration and enforcement by the political 
authorities.  Luther defined the law of God as the set of norms ordained by God 




on the pages of the Bible. He called this variously the “law of nature,” “natural 
law,” “divine law,” “Godly law,” “the law of the heart,” “the teachings of 
conscience,” “the inner law,” among others—terms and concepts that he did not 
clearly differentiate either from each other or from traditional formulations.6 His 
main point was that God’s natural law set at creation continued to operate after 
the fall into sin, and it provided the foundation for all positive law and public 
morality in the earthly kingdom. 
The natural law defined the basic duties that a person owed to God, 
neighbor, and self.  For Luther, the clearest expression of these obligations was 
the Ten Commandments. The First Table of the Decalogue set out basic duties 
and rights to honor the Creator God, to respect God’s name, to observe the 
Sabbath, to avoid idolatry and blasphemy. The Second Table set out basic 
obligations to respect one’s neighbor—-to honor authorities, and not to kill, 
commit adultery, steal, bear false witness, or covet.  Luther believed this to be a 
universal statement of natural law. “The Decalogue is not the law of Moses ... but 
the Decalogue of the whole world, inscribed and engraved in the minds of all 
men from the foundation of the world.” “[W]hoever knows the Ten 
Commandments perfectly must know all the Scriptures, so that, in all affairs and 
cases, he can advise, help, comfort, judge, and decide both spiritual and 
temporal matters, and is qualified to sit in judgment upon all doctrines, estates, 
spirits, laws, and whatever else is in the world.”7 
Knowledge of this natural law comes not only through revealed scripture, 
Luther argued, but also through natural reason and conscience. Luther echoed 
St. Paul’s notion that all persons have a “law written in their hearts,” and thus 
every rational person “feels” and “knows” the law of God.  “For they carry with 
them in the recesses of the heart a living book which would tell them more than 
enough about what they ought to do, judge, accept, and reject.”8  But sinful 
persons do not, of their own accord, readily heed the natural law. Thus, God has 
called upon other persons and authorities in the earthly kingdom to elaborate its 
basic requirements. All Christians, as priests to their peers, must communicate 
the natural law of God by word and by deed. Parents must teach it to their 
children and dependents. Preachers must preach it their congregants and 
catechumens. And magistrates must elaborate and enforce it through their 
positive laws and public policies. 
The magistrate’s elaboration and enforcement of the natural law through 
positive laws was particularly important, Luther believed, since only the 
magistrate held formal legal authority in the earthly kingdom. “Natural law is a 
practical first principle in the realm of public morality,” Luther wrote; “it forbids evil 
and commands good. Positive law is a decision that takes local conditions into 
account,” and “credibly” elaborates the general principles of the natural law into 
specific precepts to fit these local conditions. “The basis of natural law is God, 




who uses his faith, reason, and tradition to develop just laws for the community.  
The magistrate must pray to God earnestly for wisdom and instruction. He must 
maintain “an untrammeled reason” in judging the needs of his people and the 
advice of his counselors. He must summon the wisdom of the legal tradition—
particularly that of Roman law, which Luther called a form of “heathen wisdom.”9 
The magistrate must apply the law equitably, Luther insisted. “The strictest 
law [can do] the greatest wrong.”  Thus, “equity is necessary”; indeed, any 
magistrate “who does not know how to dissemble does not know how to rule.”  
To apply a rule equitably, Luther insisted “is not rashly to relax laws and 
discipline.” It is, rather, to balance firmness and fairness and to recognize 
circumstances that might mitigate against literal application of a rule or that might 
raise new issues that a rule does not and perhaps should not reach.  In such 
instances, “equity will weigh for or against” strict application of the rule, and a 
wise ruler will know the juster course. “But the weighing must be of such kind that 
the law is not undermined.”10  Lutheran jurist, Johann Oldendorp, later weaved 
Luther’s insights into a novel and comprehensive Christian theory of law, justice, 
and equity.11  
 
The Uses of the Law and the Purposes of Criminal Punishment 
Luther’s famous doctrine of justification by faith alone made clear that 
neither natural law nor positive law provided a pathway to salvation, or a stairway 
from the earthly kingdom to the heavenly kingdom.  Nonetheless, Luther insisted, 
the law still has important “uses” in this earthly life that require its constant 
maintenance and cultivation.  One such use of the law is to restrain people from 
sinful conduct by threat of punishment.  Luther called this the “civil use” of the 
law.  God wants even the worst of sinners to observe the basic law of God and 
the state -- to honor their parents, to avoid killing and stealing, to respect 
marriages and households, to testify truthfully, and the like -- so that “some 
measure of earthly order, concourse and concord may be preserved.”  Sinners, 
not naturally inclined to observe the law, may be compelled to do so by fear of 
punishment -- divine punishment as well as human punishment.  “Stern hard civil 
rule is necessary in the world,” Luther wrote, “lest the world be destroyed, peace 
vanish, and commerce and common interest be destroyed.”  Indeed, if the 
magistrate “does not punish murder and bloodshed, although he could, he is 
himself guilty of the same murders and wrongs that those villains commit.”12 
A second use of the law is to reveal to all people their sin and induce them 
to seek God’s grace.  Luther called this the “theological use” of the law.  The law 
in this sense serves as a mirror in which a sinner can reflect upon his depravity 
and see behind him the beckoning hand of a gracious God ready to forgive him 




harsher terms: “The chief and proper use of the Law is to reveal to man his sin, 
blindness, misery, wickedness, ignorance, hate, contempt of God, death, hell, 
judgment, and the well-deserved wrath of God.... When the law is being used 
correctly, it does nothing but reveal sin, work wrath, accuse, terrify, and reduce 
minds to the point of despair.”  From out of the depths of this despair, the sinner 
will cry to God for forgiveness and salvation.13   
Luther touched on a third "educational use” of the law as well. Law, in this 
sense, serves to teach the faithful, those who have already been justified by faith, 
the good works that please God.  Luther made clear that even the faithful remain 
sinful and in need of God's constant instruction through the law.  He recognized 
that sermons, commentaries, and catechism lessons on the many Old Testament 
passages on law are directed, in no small part, to teaching the faithful the 
meaning of God's law.  He wrote cryptically early in his career of the “three-fold 
use of the law” and said that the “law touches the heart and moves it, so that a 
man not only ceases to persecute, but ... desires to be better.”  But Luther never 
systematically expounded a third use of the law.14 
Luther’s close colleague and worker Philip Melanchthon did expound all 
three uses of the law, and he used this doctrine to systematize and extend 
Luther’s scattered reflections on the nature and purpose of criminal law and 
punishment.15  Like Luther, Melanchthon believed that the state had to develop a 
new and separate body of criminal law to replace both the medieval canon law of 
crimes and the Catholic Church’s detailed rules governing the sacrament of 
penance.  The state had to prohibit major crimes like treason, murder, rape, theft, 
rape, burglary, and adultery as it always had done.  But the state now had to 
prohibit many other major and minor offenses as well that were traditionally 
governed by church laws and courts.  These included religious offenses – 
heresy, sorcery, witchcraft, alchemy, blasphemy, sacrilege, Sabbath-breaking, 
tithe-breaking, false oaths, and more.  They included various family and sexual 
offenses – wife and child neglect and abuse, malicious desertion, seduction and 
fornication, prostitution, pornography, voyeurism, exhibitionism, and more.  And 
they included a growing number of offenses against “public morality and policy” 
(Polizei) – drunkness and debauchery, sumptuousness and waste, perjury and 
fraud, trade, labor, and economic crimes, proper conduct in taverns, shops, and 
lodgings, embezzlement, usury, and banking irregularities, false weights and 
measures, passport and travel violations, and much more.16  All this, said 
Melanchthon, helped the state law achieve the “civil use” of deterring bad and 
harmful conduct, the “theological use” of inducing persons to ask God and the 
church for help in living an upright life, and the “educational use” of learning how 
to love God, neighbor, and self in public and private.17 
Moreover, the state’s criminal law had to balance firmness and equity, 
severity and temperance as Luther had said.  First, magistrates had to stop using 




confessions often unreliable as evidence in criminal cases.  But such confessions 
did the defendant’s soul no good.  Medieval Catholic authorities regarded 
confession as an essential first step in receiving the sacrament of penance, 
without which the sinner faced eternal punishment in hell.  A one-time act of 
bodily torture was thought to be a small price to pay for eternal life of the soul.  
Luther and his followers rejected the sacrament of penance and the underlying 
rationale for torture.  Every sinner had to confess directly to God, without the 
mediation, let alone coercion, of church or state authorities.  Second, magistrates 
had to draw more refined distinctions between degrees of criminality and to 
prescribe a broader range of punishments short of execution.  As Luther put it: 
“criminal courts should not fill the country with widows and orphans.”18  The 
refined differentiation of mortal and venial sins and their punishment that 
historically attached to the church’s sacrament of penance, were now to be 
attached to the state’s criminal laws and punishments.  Third, magistrates had to 
work not only to retribute the crime but also to reform the criminal.  This was the 
“educational use of the law” in action.  Especially Melanchthon and later Lutheran 
and Calvinist reformers emphasized the importance of rehabilitating convicted 
defendants, consigning them to public work programs, workhouses, and 
penitentiaries (Zuchthausen) and furnishing them with chaplains, pastors, and 
teachers to bring them back to a level of sociability and morality, if not piety and 
spiritual integrity.  All these criminal justice reforms were only partly achieved in 
the sixteenth century, and they had other sources of inspiration besides 
Protestant theology– not least legal humanism and new Catholic criminal 
jurisprudence.19  But the Reformation was an important source and catalyst for 
these criminal law reforms in Protestant Germany and Scandinavia.20 
 
The New Lutheran Church Ordinances 
 
Background.  The Lutheran Reformation helped reform not only the law 
of church and state, and crime and punishment, but several other areas of law as 
well.  These legal reforms built not only Luther’s “theological” reforms, but also on 
a “legal reformation” movement that had begun a century before Luther.  
Beginning with Cologne in 1437, several German cities passed what they called 
“legal reformations” (Rechtsreformationen).  These were major new pieces of 
legislation, some in excess of 100 dense folio pages.  They included the famous 
legal reformations of Nϋrnberg, Hamburg, Tϋbingen, Worms, Frankfurt am Main, 
and Freiburg im Breisgau, passed between 1479 and 1520, that were echoed 
and excerpted by several smaller towns.  They also included the new reformation 
laws of the territories of Baden, Franken, Bavaria, and Erbach, and a whole 
series of statutes that sought to reform criminal law, criminal procedure, and 
criminal courts in Wϋrzburg, Nϋrnberg, Tyrol, Bamberg, Laibach, among others.21 
These pre-Reformation “legal reformations” aimed, in part, to routinize and 




reduced a good deal of local customary law to writing, and shifted more legal 
responsibility from the church to the state.  More fully, these legal reformations 
aimed to update and integrate these local laws to some extent -- sometimes 
plucking provisions from the many learned medieval texts and commentaries of 
Roman law and canon law as well as from the new reformation laws already on 
the books in neighboring German polities.  Later laws, such as the Reformation 
of Worms (1498) and the Statute of Freiburg im Breisgau (1520), were veritable 
codes of the new local private laws of contracts, property, inheritance, and more 
that largely replaced earlier canon law and civil law systems.  The same is true of 
some of the territorial laws of the 1500s and 1510s on criminal law and 
procedure (Halsgerichtsordnungen), like the famous Bambergensis of 1507 that 
put in place comprehensive new rules of evidence, proof, and punishment in 
criminal cases.     
These fifteenth-century legal reformations were a critical precursor to the 
legal reforms born of the Protestant Reformation.  The Protestant reformers 
simply adopted and accepted many of these pre-Reformation legal reforms.  The 
Protestant reformers sometimes offered new rationales and accents for these 
new laws, as we just saw with criminal law.  But they largely accepted the new 
laws that had already been enacted.  What they added were new laws and 
ordinances designed to distill, communicate, and enforce their most important 
new teachings.  In the early years of the Protestant Reformation, these were 
sometimes called “legal reformations” as well, echoing fifteenth-century 
terminology. They eventually came to be called Protestant or Evangelical “church 
ordinances” (Kirchenordnungen), even though they included a number of topics 
beyond church life.  Each town, city, and territory that converted to the Protestant 
cause usually had a new such “church ordinance” in place within a decade of its 
conversion.22  Hundreds of these Lutheran reformation ordinances have survived 
from the sixteenth century – a score of them drafted by Luther and Melanchthon, 
and many others drafted by leading Lutheran theologians like Johannes 
Bugenhagen, Johannes Brenz, and Andreas Osiander.23   
While these Lutheran “church ordinances” were very wide-ranging in 
subject matter, sophistication, and detail, they typically had lengthy provisions on: 
(1) religious doctrine, liturgy, and worship, and local forms of church 
administration and supervision; (2) spiritual morality; (3) poor relief and other 
forms of social welfare; (4) sex, marriage, and family life; and (5) education and 
public schools.   
Religious Doctrine and Ecclesiastical Polity.  A great number of the 
new legal provisions reflected and routinized the many new changes in doctrine, 
liturgy, and polity introduced by Luther and his followers.  These included rules 
on the resystematization of dogma; the truncation of the sacraments; the reforms 
of liturgy, devotional life, and the religious calendar; the vernacularization of the 




in lower schools and universities; the revamping of corporate worship, 
congregational music, religious symbolism, church art and architecture; the 
radical reforms of ecclesiastical discipline and local church administration; the 
new practices of tithing, baptism, confirmation, weddings, burial; diaconal care, 
sanctuary, and much more.  All these aspects of spiritual life had been governed 
in detail by the Catholic canon law and the church’s sacramental rules.  They 
were now subject to the laws of the state, set out in these Lutheran church 
ordinances.  Particularly after the Peace of Augsburg (1555) confirmed the 
constitutional principle that each civil ruler was to establish the religion of his own 
local polity (cuius regio eius religio), these rules and regulations became 
increasingly detailed and ornate. 
Spiritual Morality.  Another set of ordinances sought to govern the 
spiritual morality of church members.  This was subject to intense canon law and 
sacramental rule-making in the Middle Ages, and it was the most dramatic area 
of legal change born of the early Reformation.  In his early writings, Luther had 
railed against the canon law and sacramental rules as self-serving “human 
traditions” that intruded on the Christian conscience and abridged “the freedom of 
the Christian.” “Neither pope nor bishop nor any other man has the right to 
impose a single syllable of law upon a Christian man without his consent,” Luther 
wrote famously in 1520.  “In the entire canon law of the pope there are not even 
two lines which could instruct a devout Christian,” he wrote.  “[T]here are so 
many mistakes and dangerous laws that nothing would be better than to make a 
bonfire of it.”  “It would be a good thing if canon law were completed blotted out, 
from the first letter to the last, especially the [papal] decretals.  More than enough 
is written in the Bible about how we should behave in all circumstances.” “Unless 
they will abolish their laws and ordinances and restore to Christ’s churches their 
liberty and have it taught among them, they are guilty of all the souls that perish 
under this miserable captivity, and the papacy is truly the kingdom of Babylon 
and of the very Antichrist.”24  After such radical pronouncements, it was no 
surprise that Luther burned the canon law and confessional books in his famous 
1520 bonfire in Wittenberg.  
But Luther soon realized that they he had drawn too sharp a contrast 
between spiritual freedom and disciplined orthodoxy within the church.  Young 
Lutheran churches, clerics, and congregants were treating their new liberty from 
the canon law as license for all manner of doctrinal and liturgical experimentation 
and moral laxness.  Widespread confusion reigned over preaching, prayers, 
sacraments, funerals, holidays, and pastoral duties.  Church attendance, tithe 
payments, and charitable offerings declined abruptly among many who took 
literally Luther’s new teachings of free grace.  Many radical egalitarian and 
antinomian experiments were engineered out of Luther’s doctrines of the 




It was in response to this that Luther, Melanchthon, and other reformers in 
the later 1520s began to insist on developing internal rules of morality for church 
leaders and members to match the internal rules of order for church life. Luther 
turned to the princes and city councilors as “emergency bishops” to include new 
laws of spiritual morality as part of the new church ordinances.  A good number 
of these laws ran parallel to the new criminal laws that we just saw. These 
included laws governing church attendance and tithe payments, unnecessary 
labor and uncouth leisure on Sundays and holy days.  Other laws prohibited 
blasphemy, sacrilege, witchcraft, sorcery, magic, alchemy, false oaths, and 
similar offenses.  Sumptuary laws proscribed immodest apparel, wasteful living, 
and extravagant feasts, weddings, and funerals.  Entertainment laws placed strict 
limits on public drunkenness, boisterous celebration, gambling, and other games 
that involved fate, luck, and magic.  All these moral offenses were now regarded 
as sins to be punished by church authorities using spiritual sanctions, such as 
public confessions, fines, charitable works, bans from the Eucharist, or 
excommunication. 
The sixteenth-century church ordinances were not always clear or 
consistent, however, in drawing lines between sins punished by church 
authorities and crimes punished by the state authorities.  A Lutheran church 
member guilty of wrongdoing could be subject to both spiritual sanctions and 
criminal punishment by the state, and the authorities evidently had little sympathy 
with pleas about double jeopardy.  In some cases involving religious officials 
those double sanctions made sense: a church sexton who maliciously abused or 
deserted his spouse, a pastor who embezzled church tithes or fornicated with a 
congregant, or a catechism teacher who secretly ran a brothel or gambling house 
betrayed both church and state communities and deserved the sanctions of both 
institutions.  But in other cases, say of petty theft or skipping worship, the double 
sanctions seemed unduly harsh.  Given the volume of new state criminal and 
policy ordinances, born of the Reformation, it took some local polities some time 
to sort out these lines between sin and crime, spiritual sanction and criminal 
punishment.25 
Poor Relief and Social Welfare.  The new laws reforming poor relief and 
social welfare were a considerably more eclectic combination of Lutheran and 
humanist learning.  The medieval church taught that both poverty and charity 
were spiritually edifying.  Voluntary poverty was a form of Christian sacrifice and 
self-denial that conferred spiritual benefits upon its practitioners and provided 
spiritual opportunities for others to accord them their charity.  Itinerant monks and 
mendicants in search of alms were the most worthy exemplars of this ideal, but 
many other deserving poor were at hand as well.  Voluntary charity, in turn, 
conferred spiritual benefits upon its practitioner, particularly when pursued as a 
work of penance and purgation in the context of the sacraments of penance or 




“Inasmuch as you have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, you 
have done it unto me” (Matt. 25:40). 
These teachings helped to render the medieval Church, at least in theory, 
the primary object and subject of charity and social welfare.  To give to the 
Church was the best way to give to Christ, since the Church was the body of 
Christ on earth.  The Church thus received alms through the collections of its 
mendicant monks, the charitable offerings from its many pilgrims, the penitential 
offerings assigned to cancel sins, the final bequests designed to expedite 
purgation in the life hereafter, and much more.  The Church also distributed alms 
through the diaconal work of the parishes, the hospitality of the monasteries, and 
the welfare services of the many Church-run almshouses, hospices, schools, 
chantries, and ecclesiastical guilds.  A rich latticework of canonical and 
confessional rules calibrated these obligations and opportunities of individual and 
ecclesiastical charity, and governed the many charitable corporations, trusts, and 
foundations under the Church’s general auspices.   
Luther and other reformers rejected these traditional teachings on the 
spiritual idealization of poverty and the spiritual efficaciousness of charity.  All 
persons were called to work the work of God in the world, they argued.  They 
were not to be idle or to impoverish themselves voluntarily.  Voluntary poverty 
was a form of social parasitism to be punished, not a symbol of spiritual sacrifice 
to be rewarded.  Only the worthy local poor deserved charity, and only if they 
could not be helped by their immediate family members, the family being the first 
school of charity.  Charity, in turn, was not a form of spiritual self-enhancement.  
It was a vocation of the priesthood of believers.  Charity brought no immediate 
spiritual reward to the giver.  Instead, it brought spiritual opportunity to the 
receiver.  The Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith alone undercut the 
spiritual efficacy of charity for the giver.  Salvation came through faith in Christ, 
not through charity to one’s neighbor.  But the Lutheran doctrine of the 
priesthood of all believers enhanced the spiritual efficacy of charity for the 
receiver.  Those who were already saved by faith became members of the 
priesthood of all believers.  They were called to love and serve their neighbors 
charitably in imitation of Christ.  Those who received the charity of their 
neighbors would see in this personal sacrificial act the good works brought by 
faith, and so be moved to have faith themselves.26  
Such Lutheran teachings accorded well with some of the anti-begging 
sentiments and laws of late medieval German cities and territories.  The Lutheran 
reformers adopted and expanded these anti-begging laws with alacrity in the 
early 1520s and thereafter, often adorning these laws with ample discussion of 
their belief that it was every Christian's duty to work in a vocation and to avoid 
idle parasitism.27  Such Evangelical teachings also accorded somewhat with 
traditional understandings of what Brian Pullan has aptly called “redemptive 




The Protestant reformers, however, also went beyond these late medieval 
teachings and legal reforms.  Led by Luther’s early denunciation of celibacy and 
monasticism,29 they outlawed monasticism altogether and confiscated monastic 
properties, sometimes forcibly.  They translated their belief in the spiritual 
efficacy of the direct personal relationship between the giver and the receiver into 
a new emphasis on local charity for the local poor, without dense administrative 
bureaucracies.  Particularly the complex tangle of ecclesiastical guilds, 
endowments, foundations, and other charitable institutions of the church were, 
for the early reformers, not only economically inefficient but spiritually ineffacious.  
The “redemptive charity” that the reformers had in mind came more in the direct 
personal encounter between the faithful giver and the grateful receiver, not so 
much in the conventional notion that the receiver should experience and receive 
charity within a church institution. 
The Lutheran reformers also rejected the traditional belief that the church 
was to be the primary object and subject of charity.  For the local church to 
receive and administer charity beyond its immediate congregation, and to run 
monasteries, almshouses, charities, hospices, foundations, orphanages, and 
more detracted from its essential mission.  The local parish church should 
continue to receive the tithes of its members, as biblical laws taught.  It should 
continue to tend to the immediate needs of its local members, as the apostolic 
church had done.  But most other gifts to the church and the clergy were, in the 
reformers’ view, misdirected.  Most other forms of ecclesiastical charity, 
particularly those surrounding pilgrimages, penance, and purgation, were, for the 
reformers, types of “spiritual bribery,” predicated on the fabricated sacraments of 
penance and extreme unction and on the false teachings of purgatory and works 
righteousness.30  
In place of traditional ecclesiastical charities, the reformers instituted a 
series of local civil institutions of welfare, usually administered directly by local 
townsfolk.  Built on late medieval prototypes, these local welfare systems were 
centered on the community chest, administered by the local magistrate, and 
directed to the local, worthy poor and needy.  The community chest, whose early 
rules Luther set out in an important Wittenberg Ordinance of 1522 and Lesnig 
Ordinance of 1523, was, at first comprised of the church’s monastic properties 
and endowments that had been confiscated.  These community chests were 
eventually supplemented by local taxation and private donation.  In larger cities 
and territories, several such community chests were established, and the poor 
closely monitored in the use of their services.  At minimum, this system provided 
food, clothing, and shelter for the poor, and emergency relief in times of war, 
disaster, or pestilence.  In larger and wealthier communities, the community 
chest eventually supported the development of a more comprehensive local 
welfare system featuring public orphanages, workhouses, boarding schools, 
vocational centers, hospices, and more, administered or supervised by the local 




expressions of Luther’s ideal of the Christian magistrate as the “father of the 
community,” called to care for all the needs of his political children.   
Marriage and Family Life.  Luther and other reformers worked to reform 
not only church and state but also marriage and the family.  Prior to the sixteenth 
century, marriage was regarded as a sacrament of the church.  It was formed by 
the mutual consent of a fit man and a fit woman in good religious standing.  It 
symbolized the enduring union of Christ and his church, and conferred 
sanctifying grace upon the couple and their children. The parties could form this 
union in private, but once properly formed it was an indissoluble bond broken 
only by the death of one of the parties.  As a sacrament, marriage was subject to 
the jurisdiction of the medieval church.  A complex network of canon laws 
governed sex, marriage, and family life in detail, from abortion to euthanasia.  
The church did not regard the family as its most exalted estate, however.  
Although a sacrament and a sound way of Christian living, marriage (and with it, 
family life) was not considered to be spiritually edifying. Marriage was a remedy 
for sin, not a recipe for righteousness.  Marriage was considered subordinate to 
celibacy.  Clerics and monastics were required to forgo marriage as a condition 
for ecclesiastical service.  Those who could not were not worthy of the church’s 
holy orders and offices. 
Luther took on this traditional theological and legal teachings in five major 
tracts on marriage.31  He and his fellow reformers treated marriage, not as a 
sacrament of the heavenly kingdom, but as a social estate of the earthly 
kingdom. Marriage, they taught, was a natural institution that served the goods of 
mutual love and support of husband and wife, mutual procreation and nurture of 
children, and mutual protection of both spouses from sexual sin.  All adult 
persons, preachers and others alike, should pursue the calling of marriage, for all 
were in need of the comforts of marital love and of the protection from sexual sin. 
Moreover, the marital household served as a model of authority, charity, and 
pedagogy in the earthly kingdom and as a vital instrument for the reform of 
church, state, and civil society.  Parents served as “bishops” to their children. 
Siblings served as priests to each other.  The household altogether was a source 
of evangelical and charitable impulses in society. 
Though divinely created and spiritually edifying, however, marriage 
remained a social estate of the earthly kingdom.  All parties could partake of this 
institution, regardless of their faith or lack of it. Though guided by biblical norms 
and clerical counseling, marriage and family life were subject to the rule of the 
state, not the church.  Civil magistrates were to set the laws for marriage 
formation, maintenance, and dissolution; child custody, care, and control; family 
property, inheritance, and commerce and more. 
Lutheran magistrates rapidly translated this new Protestant gospel of 




jurisdiction from the church to the state.  They strongly encouraged the marriage 
of clergy, discouraged celibacy, and prohibited monasticism.  They denied the 
sacramentality of marriage and the religious tests and spiritual impediments 
traditionally imposed on prospective marital couples. They simplified the doctrine 
of consent to betrothal and marriage, and required the participation of parents, 
peers, priests, and political officials in the process of marriage formation and 
dissolution.  They sharply curtailed the number of impediments to marriage.  And 
they introduced absolute divorce on proof of adultery, desertion, and other faults, 
with a subsequent right to remarriage at least for the innocent party.  Almost 
every one of these legal reforms Luther had advocated and defended in his early 
writings. 
Education and Schooling.  The Lutheran reformers soon extended their 
reforms to schools, which Luther called little churches, little states, and little 
families at once.   Prior to the sixteenth century, schools were dominated by the 
church. Cathedrals, monasteries, chantries, ecclesiastical guilds, and large 
parishes offered the principal forms of lower education in Germany, governed by 
general and local canon law rules of the church.  Gifted graduates were sent on 
to church-licensed universities for advanced training in the core faculties of law, 
theology, and medicine. The vast majority of students, however, were trained for 
clerical and other forms of service in the church. 
Luther also took on this medieval tradition, too, in two major tracts and 
several smaller pamphlets on establishing public schools for children.32  The 
Lutheran Reformation transformed this church-based school system into a new 
system of public schools that allowed each youngster to prepare for his or her 
own distinctive Christian calling.   In the reformers’ view, the magistrate, as 
“father of the community,” was primarily responsible for the schooling of his 
political “children.”  Education was to be mandatory for boys and girls alike. It 
was to be fiscally and physically accessible to all.  It was to be marked by both 
formal classroom instruction and civic education through community libraries, 
lectures, and other media. The curriculum was to combine biblical and 
evangelical values with humanistic and vocational training.  Students were to be 
stratified into different classes, according to age and ability, and slowly selected 
for any number of vocations.  The public school was to be, in Philip 
Melanchthon’s famous phrase, the “civic seminary” of the commonwealth 
designed to combine deep faith and deep learning.  As the Reformation unfolded 
in Germany, the local Protestant magistrate replaced the local Catholic bishop as 
the chief protector and cultivator of the public school and university.  The state’s 
civil law replaced the church’s canon law as the chief law governing education.  
The Bible replaced the scholastic text as the chief handbook of the curriculum.  
German replaced Latin as the universal tongue of the educated classes in 
Germany. The general callings of all Christians replaced the special calling of the 





Luther’s Legal Legacy  
 
Nearly half a millennium after it first broke out in the little town of 
Wittenberg, the Lutheran Reformation still exerts influence on Western law, 
politics, and culture.  Today, in most Western legal systems, marriage is still 
viewed by many as both a civil and a spiritual institution, as Luther taught, whose 
formation and dissolution require special legal procedures.  Parents must still 
consent to the marriages of their minor children.  Peers must still attest to the 
veracity of the marital oath. Pastors or political officials must still confirm the 
marital union, if not consecrate it.  Divorce and annulment still require a special 
public proceeding before a tribunal, with proof of support for dependent spouses 
and children.   
Today, in most Western legal systems, basic education remains a 
fundamental right of the citizen to procure and a fundamental duty of the state to 
provide.  Literacy and learning are still considered a prerequisite for individual 
flourishing and communal participation.  Society still places a heavy burden on 
those who shirk education voluntarily.  The state is still the essential monitor of 
civil education, which task it discharges directly through its own public or 
common schools, or indirectly through its accreditation and supervision of private 
schools, including religious schools. 
Today, in most Western legal systems, care for the poor and needy 
remains an essential office of the state and an essential concern of the citizen.  
The rise of the modern Western welfare state over the past century is in no small 
measure a new institutional expression of the Lutheran ideal of the magistrate as 
the father of the community called to care for all his political children. The 
concurrent rise of the modern philanthropic citizen is, in no small measure, a 
modern institutional expression of Luther’s ideal of the priesthood of all believers, 
each called to give loving service to neighbors.  Sixteenth-century Lutherans and 
twenty-first-century Westerners seem to share the assumption that the state has 
a role to play not only in fighting wars, punishing crime, and keeping peace but 
also in providing education and welfare, fostering charity and morality, facilitating 
worship and piety.  They also seem to share the assumption that law has not 
only a basic use of coercing citizens to accept a morality of duty but also a higher 
use of inducing citizens to pursue a morality of aspiration. 
Much of our modern Western struggle with law, however, is also part of 
the legal legacy of the Lutheran Reformation.  For example, the Lutheran 
reformers removed the church as the spiritual ruler of Germany in expression of 
their founding ideals of religious liberty.  But they ultimately anointed the state as 
the new spiritual ruler of Germany in expression of their new doctrines of 




been locked in a bitter legal struggle to come to grips with the legacy of state 
establishments of religion while also allowing religious freedom for all. 
The Lutheran reformers removed the pope who, in their view, impugned 
the Christian conscience, fleeced the sheep of Christendom, and reduced the 
German people to quivering obedience for fear of their eternal life.  But the 
reformers ultimately anointed the secular prince as the new vice-regent of God 
on earth, the summus episcopus, with too few constitutional safeguards against 
his tyrannical excesses and too few intellectual resources to support civil 
disobedience, let alone political revolt. 
The Lutheran reformers removed clerics as mediators between God and 
the laity, in expression of St. Peter’s teaching of the priesthood of all believers.  
But they ultimately interposed husbands between God and their wives, in 
expression of St. Paul’s teaching of male headship within the home.  The 
Lutheran reformers outlawed monasteries and cloisters.  But these reforms also 
ended the vocations of many single women, placing a new premium on the 
vocation of marriage. Ever since, Protestant women have been locked in a bitter 
legal struggle to gain fundamental equality both within the marital household and 
without—-a struggle that continues in more conservative Protestant communities 
today. 
Luther’s legal legacy, therefore, should be neither unduly romanticized nor 
unduly condemned.  Those who champion Luther as the father of liberty, 
equality, and fraternity might do well to remember his ample penchant for elitism, 
statism, and chauvinism.  Those who see the reformers only as belligerent allies 
of repression and abuse should recognize that they were also benevolent agents 
of education and welfare.  Prone as he was to dialectic reasoning, and aware as 
he was of the inherent virtues and vices of human achievements, Luther would 
likely have reached a comparable assessment. 
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